After not having prioritized the purchase of currencies to provide the BCRA, the government “is played to be resolved by the electoral result” what it adds “An unnecessary risk“
Next, the full interview of Marcos Buscaglia With scope.
Journalist.: A few days ago, an entrepreneur admitted me that I expected the recovery for the second quarter of this year, but it still did not arrive and predicts being able to have better results just next year. What is the context that nourishes this idea?
Marcos Buscaglia: To understand a little where we come from and what I hope, I give you a context that is theoretical, but with a very clear consequence. The first stage of the stabilization plan – with exchange anchor – consisted of lowering inflation from very high levels. At that stage, the exchange rate was very useful.
And if one looks at the historical experience of similar plans, he tells you that: First, inflation goes down rapidly; Second, there is an economic rebound, especially in the sale of durable goods, because the real interest rate goes down and salary increases in dollars; And third, the exchange rate is appreciated. And that was what happened in Argentina between December 2023 and April 2025: inflation that goes down fast, bouncing of durable goods, and a very strong exchange appreciation.
What happens is that this scheme has a limit. Historically, it is exhausted. And for me, in this program, that was exhausted towards the end of this year’s first quarter. We saw it in specific facts: current account deficit too high, signs of exhaustion, and a central bank with negative net reserves, which even losing reservations.
That led to the Government to move towards another stage of the program: a more monetary -focused adjustment, based on the amount of money. The program with the IMF, precisely, is one with monetary goals. Historically, these schemes are recessive at the beginning – not always, but they are usually.
Q.: What indicators realize that it is an economic retraction plan?
MB: Well, the real interest rate rose: although the nominal fell, the inflation expectation fell more. The credit slowed. We see economic cooling indicators: real wages stopped growing, the default rises, the checks bounced too, there are signs in companies.
So, yes, after the rebound that the EMAE showed in April, we hope that May, June and July be months “neither fu ni fa”. I don’t think there will be a recession, much less, but a rather slow economic activity.
May data, for example, those of Orlando Ferreres, show a slight fall, and June preliminaries are mixed: in some sectors, such as cement, some indicators go up and others fall. There is no clear trend, but a slowdown.
Q.: Is this also projected for 2026?
MB: Not necessarily, that is the key. Yes I see difficult months in terms of activity and employment, but that does not imply that it lasts at 2026. The choice opens a new scenario. According to the result, there may be (or not) a new impulse to structural reforms, more investments, and refinements in the stabilization plan.
I do not believe that this current stage of the plan will last forever. We will see more opening of the CEPO, more independence from the Central Bank regarding fiscal policy, and probably adjustments in the exchange and monetary scheme. Therefore, there is room for a post -electoral recovery.
The electoral fear goes, the capital entrance chance appears, the exchange rate is already more depreciated … a new virtuous circle can be opened.
Q.: The exchange rate effectively began to depreciate, however the transfer at prices is moderate. Because?
MB: It is a very good question. I was looking just the data: there was not only a depreciation against the dollar, but also in front of the real one. And if you see the actual multilateral exchange rate, adjusted for inflation and in front of the coins of the main commercial partners, since the program began until today you have a depreciation of more than 15%.
Q.: Even so, there is no strong transfer at prices. Why?
MB: Because at the same time there is an economic opening that is generating a structural drop of prices. And also, in a weaker activity context, there is no room to transfer cost increases.
The final price of a good includes not only the cost of the product, but also freight, logistics, marketing, margins … and in a more decelerated economy, all that part stops increasing.
Q.: What type of economic-productive model is promoting the government? Is there a clear horizon?
MB: It seems to me that the model aims to have a fiscal anchor, to continue deregulating and opening. With that, eventually, to lower taxes. I don’t know how much they will be able to achieve it, but the macro model is clear: fiscal anchor, exchange flotation, deregulation.
Now, is there a productive model behind? I don’t see it. I do not believe that there is a strategy defined in sectoral terms. I would not say that it is a primaryization model either, because they are not specifically pointing out to that. It is rather an approach to the “fundamental” macro and micro of the economy, without much sector decrease.
What the government does, of course, has productive implications. Hopefully we do not have such an appreciated exchange rate in the future. In fact, something has already depreciated, more than 15%, and that is welcome. Because while you make structural reforms, you need a higher exchange rate that works as a shock absorber.
It is as if you had an athlete who does not train a long time and you send it to compete: first you have to train. The exchange rate is that mattress that gives you time.
Q.: But Milei had said that the dollar was going to reach $ 1,000. What reading did I do today?
MB: I am not clear why the president and his team insisted so much that the exchange rate was going to the band of the band. Maybe they wanted to moderate expectations to get out of the stocks in an orderly manner. And they succeeded: it was an exit without traumas, without inflationary jump. Something unpublished.
But if the dollar had effectively gone to the band’s floor, that would have been very negative, so we talked before. The exchange rate works today as a shock absorber: it gives the private sector time to adapt, while the State advances in reforms.
Q.: Those who analyze points of comparison with the ’90s, highlight the entry of capitals into quantity, which supported convertibility. If the government ensures that the guidelines of the Menemist Government are deepened, why is it not reflected to enter dollars into the same amount?
MB: Because Argentines scam. We had default, expropriations, debt restructuring, sudden changes of rules … the investor does not forget that. The multinationals are still going, not arriving. Look Carrefour, Procter and Gamble.
The stock is very problematic. And those who bought bonds in the time of Macri, in pesos, burned badly. So, everything is going to be slower now, and it is not this government’s fault: it is our history.
The government could have done more to mitigate that problem. For me, not having accumulated reservations was a mistake. If they had started buying little by little, as Chile does, which announces “I will buy 5,000 million in 100 days”, the country risk today would be lower. And that would allow you to have more chances of accessing financing.
Now you are played to be resolved by the electoral result. And that adds an unnecessary risk.
Q.: What do you think about the unwavering goal of surplus? Is it sustainable? Who is it necessary for?
MB: The primary surplus is necessary. Not as dogma, but because most of our macro problems always came from the fiscal deficit. The question is how to achieve it sustainably.
Ideally, the political arch agrees that Argentina needs a structural primary surplus. You cannot stabilize debt with current levels. If you do not achieve it, the debt grows and we return to the default. And the defaults affect the poorest. Therefore, for me, that part has to be immovable. The discussion is how you implement it, without making cuts where it does not correspond.
Source: Ambito
