In his new book, Josef Ackermann spends a lot of time praising himself. That’s a shame – because the long-time head of Deutsche Bank really has something to say.
Right at the beginning of his book, Josef Ackermann makes a joke. “All content comes from me,” writes the long-time head of Deutsche Bank in the foreword to his autobiography “My Way,” which was published on March 14, “and not from a ChatGPT text robot.”
The little gag is notable for two reasons. On the one hand, it actually remains the only place in a work of almost 250 pages in which something like humor and self-irony appears. The rest is carried by a tone of meaning and seriousness that one can hardly accuse a bank manager of, but which also precludes a more ironic approach to one’s own person.
It’s always someone else who makes mistakes
On the other hand, the reference to ChatGPT is also interesting because large parts of the book actually read at times as if the Swiss manager had given a writing command to a text program powered by artificial intelligence. Assignment: “Write a positive essay about the life and work of Josef Ackermann.” The book contains long passages of self-praise, whether it’s about Ackermann’s jobs at what later became Credit Suisse, his time at Deutsche Bank from 2002 to 2012, or his role as an important player during the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. As a rule, it is the others who make the mistakes; Ackermann only rarely has anything to blame himself for. “My desire to create certainly meant that I put a lot of demands on my employees and myself,” writes the 76-year-old. “I want to say that self-critically.” That sounds like someone who cites “too much ambition” as a personal weakness during a job interview.
Of course, no one wants to highlight their own misjudgments and dark sides in a biography. Ackermann’s book, however, drips with a penchant for justification and self-congratulation, which makes the reader rather suspicious. The victory sign during the Mannesmann trial? A big misunderstanding blown up by the media. The aggressive announcement of a target of 25 percent return on equity? Completely normal, it was a pre-tax value. The manipulation of the Libor interest rate? Others have to be responsible. The decline of Deutsche Bank? His successors just didn’t listen to him. Scandals such as the Russian money laundering model Laundromat, in which allegations were made against Deutsche Bank, are not even mentioned.
Caricature of the greedy manager
In many places, Ackermann quotes magazines, consultants or contemporaries with praise for himself on half a page. It seems almost grotesque when he refers to the former FAZ editor Frank Schirrmacher, who told him that Ackermann was overtaxing the Germans: “You just have to know – intelligent, successful, charismatic, wealthy, that’s too much for us Germans much.”
This campaign for his own reputation is all the more regrettable because Ackermann actually has something to say. The Swiss man’s view of the Germans and their envious treatment of entrepreneurs and managers is interesting and insightful. It is true that the author makes an important point here: economic success in Germany is often viewed with suspicion and is almost perceived as an indication of criminal energy. And it is also true that Ackermann became a symbol of the greedy manager in the German debate simply because he did what he was supposed to do: increase the returns and valuation of the company entrusted to him.
Josef Ackermann as an actor in the financial crisis
One of the more exciting passages in the book are the notes from the time of the global financial crisis, during which Deutsche Bank refused government aid and thus attracted anger. Here you can see that in the crucial hours, Ackermann was really close to the places where the decisions were made – in the Chancellery and in the Federal Ministry of Finance. He doesn’t shy away from handing out grades for the actors; the then State Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Jörg Asmussen, doesn’t come off as anything but good in Ackermann’s memories.
Interestingly, this is also the part of the book in which Ackermann is most likely to admit his own mistakes, even if he describes himself as just part of a pack: “Today we know that we – and by that I mean the entire industry, but also the regulatory authorities “, central banks, governments and rating agencies – have not taken the issue of the real estate market and junk mortgages seriously enough,” he writes. “Maybe we didn’t want to admit it because business was booming and we really wanted to be there.”
Financial market insiders
His view of the origins of the crisis is also remarkable because it contradicts the common interpretation in Germany: It was not just money-hungry bankers who almost caused the collapse of the world financial system, but also states that paved the way for this greed They wanted to promote the real estate market no matter what and loosen the restrictions on banks. Ackermann has a differentiated view of what is happening here, which is good for the debate about financial crises and should be taken into account in Germany.
Whenever it really gets to the nitty-gritty of the financial business, about regulation, strategy, changes in the banking industry, the book picks up speed and in some passages becomes a contemporary document worth reading. But unfortunately Ackermann is far too often busy emphasizing the value of himself. This impression is solidified at the end of the book, in which the author, accompanied by dozens of pictures of Ackermann in the circle of the powerful, captures his view of the big global questions: China, Russia, the Middle East, Ackermann has something to say about everything. And at no point does he question whether a manager, even at a large and important bank, can – and should – really have an overview of these issues.
“Enough of the self-praise,” writes Ackermann in a “balance sheet” shortly before the end of the book. There is little to add to this.
Source: Stern
