Brazil and Argentina: dangerous drift of a fundamental relationship

Both elements played a decisive role in the development of the war on the Italian front near the so-called Gothic line. And this in particular has been relevant in the international perception of both countries and in the perception of one country regarding the other when it is remembered that in 1943 the Argentine Republic had some kind of conversations in which “in a meeting held at the Government House, on June 28, 1943, Ramírez proposed to the Nazi agent an alliance to open a new front in the world war by launching an attack on Brazil in a supposed alliance with Chile and Paraguay. General Ramírez was accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel González (Juan Perón’s rival within the GOU), head of the presidential Chancellery; Captain Filippi, Ramírez’s assistant and son-in-law and Major Bernard, private secretary to the Minister of War.” It was not about Argentina aligning itself with the German regime, but rather exploring ways to operate politically, when in reality there was a complex and mistaken perception of our great neighbor to the north.

In addition to strictly international political attitudes, the comparative phenomena between countries have also created a wide scope of suspicion, of symbolic competition between them, and in this the economic transformation of Brazil is relevant. “A detailed analysis of the history of these countries allows us to find in the decades of the 60s and 70s a period characterized by a strong growth of Brazil far above Argentina. The Brazilian military governments again rescued the national interest as the foundation of their foreign policy, which was oriented around the axes that had been promoted by the previous civilian presidents, which helped to produce a notable economic growth. This boom of the Brazilian economy, described as an “economic miracle”, accelerated the evolution of the industrial park of Brazil, which began to export a good part of its production, capital and services to Latin America, and strove to open markets in Asia and Africa, at the same time that it continued to export raw materials to the USA, Europe and Japan.”

An impressive case study of the uneven development of both countries is the comparison of the Brazilian and Argentine aeronautical industries. Between 1945 and 1963, the Argentine aeronautical industry was a pioneer in Latin America, in the number of prototypes and in the technological advances it introduced, up to the manufacture of the first twin-turboprop civil transport aircraft, the Guaraní II. During that same period, the Brazilian aeronautical industry was merely a set of workshops that assembled foreign aircraft. Today, the Brazilian Aeronautical Company SA, better known as Embraer, is a world leader in the production of civil transport aircraft and for more than 30 years has been one of the three largest industrial exporters in Brazil. A combination of a proactive industrial policy that has persisted over time, and the professionalization of the company’s management, even though it was publicly owned, allowed this growth.

A crucial point in these relations between both countries was the signing of the Treaty of Asunción on 03/26/1991, the founding stone of Mercosur, whose article 1 stated “The States Parties decide to establish a Common Market, which must be formed by December 31, 1994, which will be called “Common Market of the South” (MERCOSUR). This Common Market implies:

-The free movement of goods, services and productive factors between countries, through, among others, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the circulation of goods and any other equivalent measure;

-The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy with respect to third States or groups of States and the coordination of positions in regional and international economic and commercial forums;

-The coordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the States Parties: foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal, monetary, exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications and others that may be agreed upon, in order to ensure adequate conditions of competition between the States Parties;

-The commitment of the States Parties to harmonize their legislation in the relevant areas, in order to strengthen the integration process.”

It was a very ambitious project that required complex financial and fiscal engineering in each nation and the coordination of local industrial policies in a convergent industrial policy of the signatory nations. All of this had implementation problems and provisional stages that tried to resolve the final objective of a common market for some particular cases. Thus, in 2019, the Argentine government and the Brazilian government signed an agreement to complement the automotive industry: “The governments of Brazil and Argentina reached an agreement today that extends managed free trade in automotive production (Flex) until 2029. This is a gradual scheme towards free trade that will last ten years, in line with the agreement reached two months ago between Mercosur and the European Union. This is the longest period reached between both countries.”

This is one of the most important tools in the economic convergence towards a complete common market. Complex negotiations are also being carried out to obtain a common phytosanitary policy for trade flows of agricultural and livestock products between countries, for which the so-called Animal Health Commission was created in 1993 to work in this direction.

The signing of a Common Market Treaty represents a commitment to stable state policies in the very long term, because the dynamic effects of this integration are only the result of processes of economic investment and legal administrative readjustment that require internal consensus in each nation and between nations, which goes beyond mutual suspicions that may have a very old historical source but which become dysfunctional when integration policies are the most relevant.

In 2022, the main destination of Argentine exports was the Federative Republic of Brazil with 12.6 MM dollars, and in mutual exchanges almost 20% of the products involve the automotive industry, therefore, the exchange between Argentina and Brazil is absolutely central to the persistence and growth of our own Automotive and automotive industry.

In the above context, it is not difficult to understand why the relations between the Argentine Republic and the Federative Republic of Brazil are the most sensitive and important for our national interests. Because it is our main foreign client, it is the main economic power of Mercosur, and because its proactive industrial policy has led it to be an important participant in the world market of industrial goods. And it is precisely for this reason that relations between the countries are based on common interests negotiated in terms of reciprocity, regardless of the personal assessments that officials who are temporarily in charge of a government position have regarding officials who are in the other country.

This is a dangerous and almost unique drift, which began when the then president-elect Javier Gerardo Mileipraised the former president of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro, when he visited him after winning the presidential elections, pointing out that “… in the meeting with Bolsonaro, he was very “proud” of the visit of the former president of Brazil, whom he said he “greatly admires for his fight against the international left, which tries to interfere by dividing the country and the world by fighting against freedom,” he accused the current president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silvahighly corrupt and communist, which prompted a demand for rectification by the Brazilian president, which President Javier Milei refused to do.

And this has produced a total lack of communication between the two presidents, as occurred at the recent meeting of the Group of Seven in Italy, where, as the information indicates, they did not even greet each other.

An old saying typical of political cynicism says: “choose your enemies and don’t let them choose you”In other words, when a nation decides to start a course of conflict with others, the motives have to be very strong and must include the nation’s own independent subsistence, as is the case with war. But the Treaty of Asunción and Mercosur arose precisely as a tool to eliminate from the future of international relations in South America any fantasy and any possibility of a war. Or even of an arms race. That is, of investing money in tasks that are not fundamental for the development and justice of the peoples.

Embracing an integration cause implies compromises, local interests will be affected, and there are no easy solutions – for example, the European Union has not yet achieved a common agricultural policy that would allow it to avoid the multi-million subsidies granted to the sector – but the net results of integration are always very favourable. This requires state policies that go beyond the personal opinions of this or that official and that act precisely as inhibitors when these officials are tempted to transform their personal opinions into political positions for the nation.

Argentina is entering into extremely dangerous territory in its relations with Brazil, by transforming international relations that should bring us closer to them into an imaginary anti-communist crusade that severely harms the honour of nations, and the only possible result is to damage Argentina’s national and social interests, such as the possible risk that the bilateral automotive agreement will be cancelled at the request of President Lula da Silva, since “Brazil is pressuring the Argentine government to eliminate the flexi-agreement that regulates managed free trade in automotive production, a decision that could destroy the national industry.”

Master in Communication, Culture and Media Discourses. (UNLAM). Graduate in Social Communication (UNLAM). Professor of History. Writer. Published book “Fake News: All news is false until proven otherwise”