The economic policy of the Argentine government under the management of Javier Milei has been defended vehemently as a “shock therapy” aimed at correcting decades of fiscal and monetary detached. However, behind the incendiary discourse and libertarian aesthetics, The true engine of momentary stability has not been an integral economic program, but a money table orchestrated by Minister Luis Caputo and his team of the same profile. Its strategy, based on short -term debt operations, fees management and contained but latent issuance, resembles the logic of a trading desk “than to that of a responsible macroeconomic management.
This article seeks to warn about the growing risks of this policy, especially in the electoral context of 2025, where the financial horizon is tightened by increasing maturity, exchange volatility, monetary fragility and an “stability illusion” sustained with wire.
Economic policy or trading table?
From his return to the public function in just 5 years, Luis Caputo has assumed a leading position in the administration of the debt and the liquidity of the system. But his approach does not perform too much from what he had when he led private financial tables; Administer maturities as if they were positions, speculate with the yield curve and trust the “market psychology.” In that context, domestic debt tenders have become the main instrument of economic policy.
In the last tender, the Government managed to renew just 70% of the maturities, and it came without obtaining 100% roll since the beginning of the year. However, not reaching the full rollover, the treasure resorted to pay with pesos to cover the refinancing deficit. Since January 2025, the net broadcast for this concept has been increasing, blurring any serious monetary discipline. The problem is not only quantitative, but institutional; The Treasury has taken control of monetary policy by setting the cutting rate in each tender, leaving the BCRA in a subordinate role. This dynamic dilutes the independence of the BCRA and undermines any credible nominal anchor.
A mountain of maturities ahead
The numbers are eloquent. Between May and December 2025 they expire $ 65,975 billion pesos (or to the intended change of $ 1,000 per dollar: US $ 65,975 billion). And, in that logic, if the first quarter of 2026 is included, the total amounts to AU $ S82,045 million. This expiration calendar represents a significant threat to financial stability, especially if the Government fails to improve its “rollover” (renewal by means of prior to the maturities).
Graphically, the accumulation of maturities composes an explosive curve in a country where there is no voluntary debt market. Each tender is transformed into a high -risk event, and the sensitivity to the rate – yet political perception – increases. October, month of the legislative elections, is historically a turning point in risk aversion, which can precipitate-let’s say, from July or August-a massive withdrawal of pesos to cheap dollars.
Experience offers a clear lesson; Given the slightest doubt of political continuity, the market abandons the instruments in pesos, forcing the BCRA to intervene with issuance or reserves. This time, the situation is even more precarious; The Treasury dollar account is falling au $ 3,064 million, while only July 9 expire $ 4,606 million in global and bonars bonds. If external financing is not accessed, there will be no option, pesos must be issued and sell them to acquire the necessary currencies, feeding an exchange pressure in a context of meager reserves.
The mirage of balance Inflation, emission and demand for money
From orthodoxy, it is argued that the “closes” program if monetary issuance is avoided. However, reality is more complex. The partial exchange repression and the progressive loss of credibility in the future months, make the speed of circulation of fixed -term money or the “non -renewal of banks” shoot at any expectations shock. The recent exchange flexibility and technological advancement, in addition, allow to reconfigure portfolios in seconds, today you can pass fixed deadlines to transactional deposits, or directly to dollar.
This behavior makes traditional monetary aggregates (M2, M3) lose anchoring capacity. As a result, even a moderate emission can have disproportionate effects on prices or the dollar. The alleged fiscal balance does not reach whether the treasure issues to pay local debt or finances expenses in contexts where the rollover fails. Thus, the nominality is supported on a thread.
To top it off, the government itself sabotees the carased objective of recapitizing the BCRA. The recent transfer of $ 12 billion in BCRA profits to the Treasury is a clear example; The balance sheet of the issuing bank is deteriorated to cover fiscal holes, without any improvement in market confidence. The result is a consolidated debt more opaque and risky.
The agreement with the IMF is more creative accounting than real consolidation
One of the main achievements that the government exhibits is the agreement with the IMF. But what “avoided” was an immediate collapse of reserves and the default (only in dollars) that could come for the US $ 18.5 billion that overcome in the next 12 months. A structural solution was not obtained. The IMF disbursements were used to repurchase intransferable letters of the treasure and “capitalize” to the BCRA. However, the debt/GDP ratio did not fall, and the country risk remains at levels incompatible with a return to the market in 2026. New debt can not be taken at 11% in dollars.
The supposed success of the government lies in postponing payments and gaining time every week. But time for what? There is no economic plan, there is no industrial policy, not even a serious monetary stabilization scheme that contemplates the bimonary nature of the Argentine economy. The only horizon is the next tender.
Where is all this going?
Luis Caputo has been effective in building a narrative of “Financial Salvador” that, like any successful story, is sustained in omission. Omits the costs of your strategy, which fall on the productive apparatus, retirees, employees and provinces. Also omit that a trader cannot administer a state; Its logic is short -term, immediate maximization, to “get done.” But Argentina needs something else.
The main risk is not a run in itself, but the structural fragility of the current scheme. When 100% of the economic effort is set to support a “temporary carry” with treasure instruments, without reservations, without trust, and with increasing contingent emission, the maneuver margin is reduced to zero. Any unexpected event – political, external or climate – can shoot a violent portfolios rearrangement, leaving exposed to the BCRA and the exchange rate.
The irony is that those who defend this policy as “libertarian” are not doing more than perpetuating the dependence of the Argentine state of monetary financing, covert under the figure of “partial role.” Of liberalism, little. Financial pragmatism, too much.
The disturbing of the Caputo experiment is not his audacity, but his inevitability. Because deep down, there is no room; Everything is played, and everything depends on the market believes that a castle of cards with weekly maturities, scarce dollars and deferred emission can be sustained. But the traders – and Caputo knows better than anyone – are the first to flee when the spread widens and the liquidity disappears.
The government is not building a future; You are buying time. And it does it at the cost of mortgageing all the necessary tools to stabilize the economy seriously. Each weight emitted to cover a rollover deficit is another spark in the monetary polvorín. Each transfer from the BCRA to the Treasury is a wound to the heart of an entity that no longer handles the rate, neither the monetary policy, nor its credibility.
October will not just a political test. It will be the time when the market begins to wonder if Argentina has a plan, or only has operators. And when that day arrives, no more tenders will be enough, or more makeup. The real economy – that the economic team does not see for years – will ask for answers.
Then, when the productive framework and social conflict begin to creak, when organizations and/or the parallel exchange rate break the silence, when the maturities no longer find enough plaintiffs in the tenders, that it is not said that it was a black swan. Don’t say anyone saw him come. The economy is not a money table, and the country is not a trading form.
Director of Esperanza Foundation. Postgraduate professor at UBA and private universities. Master in International Economic Policy, Doctor of Political Science, author of six books.
Source: Ambito
David William is a talented author who has made a name for himself in the world of writing. He is a professional author who writes on a wide range of topics, from general interest to opinion news. David is currently working as a writer at 24 hours worlds where he brings his unique perspective and in-depth research to his articles, making them both informative and engaging.
