On the surface, Argentina of 2025 seems to have reached a long -desired milestone; The fiscal surplus. However, under that apparent accounting balance a financial time bomb is hidden. As in a work already represented in 2001 and again in 2018, the resource to debt instruments that capitalize on interest is building a solvency mirage, while the real deficit accumulates in the shadow. LECAP, BANCAP, LEFI and PR17 not only postpone payments; They aggravate the structural problem and distort the fiscal photo. Fear is not unfounded. Experience indicates that these creative accounting games, when sustained without genuine support, usually end in crisis; The 2001 default or the “compulsive impact” of Lacunza in 2018 are too close precedents. Are we facing a known and ended script repetition?
Since the end of 2023, the Argentine Ministry of Economy has intensified the use of financial instruments with interest capitalization. Unlike traditional bonds that accrue periodic interests, capitalizable letters (LECAP), capitalizable bonds (Boncap), treasure letters tied to monetary policy rate (LEFI) and PR17 bonds allow to postpone the payment of interest, accumulating them on capital and accruing them entirely at the expiration [OPC]2025).
Numbers that do not close
In April 2025, the National Treasury reported a financial surplus of $ 572,341 million. However, by including capitalized interests, the real result shows a deficit of $ 4,190,377 million. Only in that month, the capitalization of interest totaled $ 4,762,718 million (OPC, 2025). This difference shows the illusory character of the surpluses celebrated officially.
This phenomenon is not marginal. According to data from the same agency, during 2024 capitalized interests represented 2.6% of GDP, a figure that shot 4.8% of GDP in the first four -month period of 2025, even in a context of rate reduction. This disproportionate increase alerts on an unsustainable pattern; A supervoid fiscal result based on the postponement of the deficit.
When the past returns disguised as novelty
Argentina’s recent economic history warns about the risks of these financial schemes. Between 1996 and 2001, under the convertibility regime, the National Government systematically resorted to debt in increasingly onerous conditions, encouraged by the enthusiasm of global banks such as Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank and JP Morgan. One of his star operators on Wall Street was, precisely, Luis Caputo, today Javier Milei’s Minister of Economy (Basualdo, 2021; Muchnik, 2002).
During the administration of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019), Caputo returned to the scene, this time as an architect of an accelerated return to the voluntary debt market. The cycle culminated abruptly in 2018 with a collapse of trust, capital escape and the so -called “compulsive impact” of maturities under the management of Hernán Lacunza, immediate successor of Dujovne (Rapaport, 2019). Logic was similar; Finance the deficit without structural adjustment, accumulate unpayable maturities and hold the exchange rate by debt.
The present cycle under Javier Milei reproduces, with nuances, that sequence. But with a subtle and dangerous difference; Most of the indebtedness in 2025 pesos is short -term, in capitalizable instruments, placed almost exclusively in the local banking system or in investment funds. That is, the debt not only grows; It concentrates and expires soon.
The “institutionalized carry” as a monetary anchor
The attractiveness of these instruments lies in their implicit profitability. Lecap, for example, capitalize monthly interest at high monthly rates (TME), which represents a higher annual rate in effective terms (ASD). In turn, the Lefi capitalize daily to the annual nominal monetary policy rate. For banks and funds, they represent an alternative of financial arbitration without risk; They buy debt in pesos with guaranteed liquidity, anchored by deposits or by BCRA assistance.
This mechanism reproduces, with new clothes, the “financial bicycle” model known as Carry Trade. Its sustainability depends on two factors: the exchange stability and the capacity of the treasure to renew the maturities. But both are in doubt. The fall in Net BCRA reserves and the fragility of real tax revenues put that apparent balance (Ferreres, 2025) at risk.
Reperfilation or undercover default?
The way followed reminds the logic that preceded the critical events of 2018. At that time, the Treasury failed Sturzenegger, 2020).
With maturities of LECAP and BANCAP for more than $ 25 billion in the second semester of 2025 (Ministry of Economy, 2025), and with a market that shows signs of fatigue, the risk of a similar event grows. The difference between nominality and real repayment capacity is extended. And as in 2001 or 2018, internal debt can quickly transform into a systemic trigger if trust is eroded.
Political and social consequences of a crisis announced
The risk is not merely technical: the financial deficit cuts are called default and are not as easy as – now – cut the primary expense. History shows that financial collapses in Argentina quickly translate into social and political crises, converge. In 2001, the default and the bank run triggered an institutional outbreak with five presidents in a week. In 2018, the loss of credibility of the economic program sealed the anticipated political end of macrismo.
Today, the social base of the Government of Javier Milei faces increasing tensions. An eventual episode of financial stress – default, forced impact or strong devaluation – could dramatically alter governance. If the implosion of financial contracts with banks and funds is added to this, the impact on the banking system and political stability would be severe.
The capitalization of interests today represents a kind of “elegant default.” It is avoided to pay now, but they accumulate liabilities that threaten future stability. The financial surplus that the Government celebrates is, in the facts, an accounting illusion sustained by fiscal postponement mechanisms. When these maturities materialize – in a context of still high rates, limited and growing distrust reserves – the pressure on the treasure could trigger a high -risk scenario. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that, before finishing 2025 or starting 2026, Argentina in front of a financial, political and social crisis of comparable magnitude – or even superior – to those of 2001 and 2018. More than a warning, this conclusion is an empirical verification based on the repetition of patterns. And how they teach Argentine economy and political history; What is postponed with debt, does not disappear. It is enhanced.
References: Basualdo, E. (2021). Bread and escape: an analysis of recent Argentine economic history (1976–2019). 21st century editors. Ferreres, O. (2025). Monthly Economic Report – April 2025. Orlando J. Ferreres & Associates. Levy Yeyati, E., & Sturzenegger, F. (2020). The return of economists. Penguin Random House. Ministry of Economy. (2025). Calendar of Public Debt Mallings – Second semester 2025. Government of the Argentine Nation. Muchnik, D. (2002). Argentina devoured. Planet. Congress budget office. (2025). Monthly Public Finance Report – April 2025. https://www.opc.gob.ar. Rapaport, M. (2019). The debt policy in the Macri era. Economic Reality Magazine, 321, 9-38.
Director of Esperanza Foundation. Postgraduate professor at UBA and private universities. Master in International Economic Policy, Doctor of Political Science, author of six books.
Source: Ambito
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