Wolfgang Ischinger does not believe in fertile Trump-Putin meetings

Mr. Ischinger, what surprised you this week?
I was surprised that a lot of a lot believe that the planned meeting of Trump and Putin to Ukraine is actually moving in the matter that there could even be a trilateral summit. Putin has already collected the view of the latter, which does not surprise me at all.

But don’t you see a harder gait of Trump against Putin?
Yes, if you believe Trump’s announcements, but unfortunately his current procedure makes me doubt. Trump actually wants to start – for example tariffs – from a position of strength. If he had said: Before I meet Putin, I will initially impose huge sanctions against him, announce the delivery of massive new weapons systems, and then he can come and negotiate for a certain consideration – that would have been an appearance of the strength. But that’s exactly what he didn’t do. I am surprised at how easy it is to be Putin not only to move parts of the American administration, but also to the international opinion -forming elites in a trance according to the motto: Now the breakthrough comes. Instead, he plays temporarily and simply continues to follow his maximum goals instead of being really ready to negotiate. One thing is already clear: the Trump ultimatum, which would have expired these days, has apparently swept off the table in an interview with his special representative Steve Witkoff. So advantage Putin.

After all, it is the first meeting between a Russian and an American president in over four years.
It is good and correct that the two meet, after all, these are the two central global nuclear powers. But as a diplomatic practitioner, I have to tell you: If the preparation of this meeting is exhausted in the Moscow visit of Steve Witkoff, who is in the Kremlin people who have people who have 30 or more years of experience and manipulation ability, then I am not exactly optimistic. Extremely complex questions are up to: Ukrainklieg, nuclear arms control, Middle East including Iran, and so on. It would be almost a diplomatic miracle if this summit would actually make substantial and sustainable, i.e. resilient progress to terminate the Ukraine secret. But let’s hope that I am not optimistic enough for once.

Some speak of a trap of Putin: he just wraps Trump around his finger.
I share this concern. Putin could find a way to pull the bilateral process started in Saudi Arabia. Then the two talk about Iran and other herd of crisis, and Putin is already a conversation partner at eye level – which he did not deserve, as long as he has not proven that he is ready to end the war. In my view, it would have been better to only offer Putin such a summit if it is clear that the summit would announce a concrete result – for example, a negotiated ceasefire agreement.

Four decades ago, US President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met several peaks to advance arms control and disarmament. How long have such a summit prepared?
The experts, who then negotiated about nuclear armaments control, i.e. about strategic and medium -range weapons, spoke to the other for many weeks or continuously. For example, it went and goes to complicated questions of the technical possibilities of verification made. Incidentally, that would also be a central topic if an end of the war could actually be brought about in Ukraine. Due to the 1980s into the 1990s up to and including the beginning of the Putin era, even professional trust relationships between the peggans and their teams developed. For strategic stability in the crisis, it is important that you can assess the others. Unfortunately, there is little to see at the moment, and this is anything but calming. Instead, Trump has Medvedev on a public verbal boxing match about the nuclear war. Not particularly promoting trust, especially here in Germany, where the irrational fear of a nuclear war is particularly rampant.

I don’t dare to ask, Mr. Ischinger: Where are the Europeans?
Very good question! In the case of Ukraine, it is a war in the immediate vicinity of the European Union or the European NATO members. Yes, Trump now regularly calls Chancellor Merz, President Macron and others. I don’t want to talk that out. This is very good and very important. However, it would be even more important and much better if the United States set up a kind of contact group with partners such as Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Poland, Turkey, etc. A diplomatic-geostrategic contact group-a model of multilateral crisis diplomacy already very proven in the nineties-that could make thoughts about a future reorganization of a euro-atlantic security architecture and develop suggestions how a possible agreement in the UkraineKrege could then be checked: Who checked the contact line, who verified agreements on the deduction of soldiers and weapons? The OSCE or who does that? Because we Europeans will ultimately be those who have to implement the result and, if necessary, have to live with it if such agreements are not sufficiently waterproof and verifiable.

Another topic in which Europeans look bad is Gaza. However, it seems that Germany plays the role here that Hungary plays on the subject of Ukraine: We block sanctions against Israel, weaken the EU and thus play the government of Netanyahu, who occupy the Gaza Strip and even want to drive away the Palestinians from there. Did we Germans betray ourselves with our state rush in the face of the tragedy in Gaza?
In my view, the central problem is that the European Union does not speak to one voice. It makes me unhappy that after decades full of lip service about a common European foreign policy, this has become a pile of rubble, especially when it comes to the Middle East after October 7, 2023. For historical reasons, it is right and understandable that Germany is not at the top of the convoy in Israel policy.

But Germany has long made itself across from the sanction plans of the other countries.
What takes place here is not really an approach to a new Middle East policy of the EU – as promised. It is French Middle East policy, it is British Middle East policy, it is Spanish and Italian politics, and so on. Everyone in their own way. But there is no sufficiently energetic effort that the EU countries actually speak again with one voice. Why don’t you give Kaja Kallas, who has been made the new so -called Foreign Minister of the EU with fanfares, not even a chance? She can hardly travel to the region sensibly because, as an EU representative, she has no basis for this: there is no common position.

But what could a common position of Europeans look like?
Fortunately, Germany arises for majority decisions in EU foreign policy. A majority decision on Israel would probably be one with which the Federal Republic would be very difficult. If sanctions or similar measures are adopted, a country like Germany must have the possibility of a so-called “opt-out”. That means: Yes, although we have shared EU policy, we will not participate in the implementation. Such exceptions were able to use other countries in other situations. So that would be nothing new in principle. In principle, Germany could remain true to its specific Israel policy-Keyword State Räson-without wanting to prevent 450 million people. In addition, the current decision of the Federal Government shows to the delivery stop of weapons that Israel could use in the Gaza War that Germany is not far from the line of Europeans in the basic questions.

How is Europeans acting internationally on this question?
We see a huge loss of credibility. The rest of the world has been able to hear for many years that we Europeans are the champions of human rights. We have brought institutions such as the International Criminal Court in Den Haag on the way. Now, from the outside, we look rather weak. The small Qatar seems to play a more visible role in many topics, including hostage liberation, than the entire and even so powerful European Union. This also includes the other areas in which the EU looks weak at the moment, in trade policy, artificial intelligence, with military performance. We have a weak phase of Europe. To overcome them, I see the great future task of the new federal government, together with our important neighbors and partners.

Mr. Ischinger, and where is the positive this week?
The bottom line is that a veritable trade war with the trade war -friendly Donald Trump could be avoided. It is not everything in dry cloths, it is not really gratifying, but at least our economy knows the direction in which we can operate transatlantic trade. In view of the geopolitical weather situation, this is relatively positive.