Debate about the AfD ban: “The effects should not be overestimated”

GEO: Professor Poguntke, in the current debate about a possible party ban procedure for the AfD, reference is repeatedly made to the failed NPD ban procedures in 2003 and 2017. Can the two cases be compared?
Prof. Thomas Poguntke: It’s always good to look at previous judgments, but there are clear differences here. In 2003, the NPD ban process failed because informants from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution were also active in the party’s leadership. And in 2017, the Federal Constitutional Court found that the NPD was unconstitutional but too insignificant to pose a threat to democracy. There can be no question today that the AfD is insignificant. In this respect, the comparison between the NPD ban proceedings and a possible AfD proceedings is flawed.

What influence do party ban procedures have on the favorability of voters?
In the case of the NPD, this is not so easy to say. On the one hand, it was a gain in prestige for the party not to be banned. On the other hand, it was unable to achieve increased election results. It was already too small to achieve measurable effects in surveys.

This article will be with you for ten days star available. You will then find it again exclusively at GEO.

And what effect do you think a ban would have on the AfD’s poll numbers, regardless of the result?
A trial could inadvertently grant the AfD martyr status: it is already telling the narrative that established political forces supposedly want to exclude it from competition. A party ban would be grist for the mill of this argument.

But couldn’t it also be the case that a party ban process prevents voters from voting for such a badly-reputed party?
I can’t imagine that. In the USA, legal disputes and decisions tend to increase Donald Trump’s poll numbers. It cannot be determined that voters turn away from parties or politicians solely because of legal proceedings.

There have been two successful party ban proceedings in the history of the Federal Republic: in 1952 against the Socialist Reich Party (SRP) and in 1956 against the Communist Party of Germany (KPD). What can be derived from these successful party bans?
That we should not overestimate the effects of party bans. The German Communist Party (DKP) was founded in 1968 – as a kind of successor organization to the KPD. Right-wing extremist parties also continued to exist, such as the German Reich Party. We have to be clear: AfD voters would not simply disappear from the scene in the event of a party ban. Therefore, the crucial question from a political science perspective is: How can the centrist parties convince this electorate again?

Are party bans actually suitable as a protective shield for democracy?
I’m skeptical about that. Internationally, most democracies do not ban parties. This is almost a German peculiarity that goes back to the experiences with National Socialism. Only a few other democratic countries have so far banned parties, for example Spain. The best way to reduce the electorate of radical parties is an attractive political offer from the centrist parties. This is what is lacking at the moment: in the eyes of many voters, the CDU is not yet fully positioned as a credible opposition party and, as all surveys show, the traffic light coalition is in great difficulty.