Ukraine in the fourth year of war – so it is military in 2025

On February 24, the war in Ukraine went into the fourth year. In all, 2025 will be even more difficult for Free Ukraine than the already catastrophic 2024. In the decisive land war, the Russians win the ground. The Ukrainian troops go back to all front sections in the east, they delay the Russian advance, in some places they also succeed in stopping the Russians for a long time – but in the great picture the Russians win. Her advance even accelerates. A clear sign of this can also be found in reporting. The loss of individual villages is no longer reported, even the case of cities is acknowledged.

Only in the Kursk region did Kyiv get an attack with limited winning. This front floors are defended tough, but has been shrinking for months. In some places, the Russians have already reached the starting positions at the border. At the same time, they approached the last replenishment street to Sudscha.

A trend reversal is not in sight. Russia has around 700,000 men. They face around 400,000 Ukrainians on the front. Overall, the Russians do not achieve multiple superiority of how it actually requires a major offensive. Therefore, they have relied on another strategy. Although the number of soldiers has increased since 2022, the front line has been filled. The (rusi) estimates that a Ukrainian brigade has to cover up to 27 kilometers of front, with a target strength of around 3500 men, which is often not reached. This “overstretching” is reinforced on both sides.

The Russians use their advance to “bloom” the front. You can do this because Kyiv does not want to give up any area to straighten this line. The Russians are not looking for the big offensive, they are looking for gaps and weak spots in defense to usually attack very manageable forces. Again and again attacks are knocked back, but ultimately the Russians come to the goal. The fact that two newly established fight units of Ukraine – the 155th and 157th mechanized brigade – have been de facto before the enemy contact by massage, as it reported, among other things “” and “”, is a threatening sign. It is by no means a matter of course that the losses on the front can be further compensated for by trained and motivated soldiers. Let us know that Ukraine can meet Putin’s personnel growth.

Kyiv can keep the front primarily because of the use of small drones. This does not mean that artillery, mortar and other heavy weapons have no meaning on the front. However, the Ukrainian armed forces have too little of it, while the replenishment of drones works. It is neither bound to the classic armaments industry nor to the benevolence of the allies. Small drones also have the advantage that they cannot be spied on and destroyed before starting an operation.

The development of the drone war has so far been full of surprises, so forecasts are difficult. Additional armor and entire housing make it difficult to destroy armored vehicles. Electronic warfare has made it difficult to use radio -controlled drones, but models have appeared that are controlled by cable. Drones that attack goals independently are now in use.

Both sides also work on weapons that can shoot small drones at a short distance. And they discovered networks. They are excited about positions and in forests and should even protect entire streets. An attacking drone gets tangled in such a network, and other drones should first blow up a hole in the lock in front of a successful blow. If a forest is protected by several curtains from nets, getting through is practically impossible.

In the meantime, the critical infrastructure is increasingly destroyed in Ukraine. Within half a year, the Russians were able to punish the number of attacks with low -cost drones according to Iranian tree patterns – 2500 of these drones are now flying within one month. The Russian Ministry of Defense plans to produce 750 ISKander missiles in 2025 and more than 560 KH-101 jam aircraft.

The most frightening is the number of sliding bombs. These bombs are released from a jet outside the range of air defense and then float to the finish with stub wings. In 2023, Putin was able to use about 4,000 of these bombs. In 2024 there were more than 40,000, and 70,000 are now to be produced in 2025. The bombs themselves weigh between 500 kilograms and three tons. For comparison: March missiles bring between 400 and 700 kilograms to the finish.

Even more dangerous: the Russians have developed improved slides, the range of the new double-decker glider should be up to 165 kilometers. The zone of use grows enormously. If you roughly calculate about 30 kilometers of “safety distance” to the front line, the old slide set can penetrate about 40 kilometers behind the Ukrainian front, but the new 135 kilometers.

In fact, Kyiv also succeeded. The Russian Black Sea fleet was not only neutralized, its ships are almost hunted. Ukraine has developed a whole series of impressive long -distance roar that always attack goals deep in Russia. With small drones, the Ukrainians are at least equal, if not superior.

The outlook remains dark. In fact, it is now conceivable that the war ends in a few months. At least that is the publicly declared goal of the government of US President Donald Trump. However, it is also possible that the parties do not agree or that negotiations are still taking for months. Until then, an intensification of the fights can be expected. Both sides know that the changes in the war situation and especially on the ground will be reflected directly in a negotiation result. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin will therefore do everything to adjust the slump in Kursk. And at the same time to build even more momentum on the front in the east.

The more an end to the war is nearby, the more ruthless it will be led by Moscow. Putin will want to bring his troops as close to the Dnjepr as possible and possibly try to build a bridgehead on the other bank again. The biggest challenge for Ukraine will be to maintain the replenishment of armor goods in the next few months and to prevent further erosion of the morals of the troops.

A peace solution is expected to be far from the war destinations of Kiev – liberation of all occupied areas including the Crimea – and that area ability and restrictions on state sovereignty include. A peace for Russia and an admission of the military defeat for Ukraine. Such a result should have a negative impact on the combat strength of the Ukrainian armed forces before the contract was concluded.