Course ceremony in Ukraine: Collapse after the storm from the tube

For a long time, the Ukrainians held their front lead at Kursk – now they were beaten. An attack from an underground accelerator pipeline led to the collapse of the courtyard – the event, this “storm from the tube”, will go into the history of this war.

The year 2024 was shaped by a tough but continuous advance of the Russian troops in the east of Ukraine. In August, the Ukrainian high command dared to take a bold liberation. His troops overrun the only weakly occupied border, invaded in a push-similar to the successful Charkov offensive in 2022-towards the big city of Kursk and the first larger village conquered the small town of Suha, a logistical hub and the symbol of the offensive. Beyond the border, however, Putin’s troops made tough resistance. The surprise moment faded, the Russians insulated the slump, and large -scale Ukrainian maneuvers were in the direction of the Consk, although the positions in hard fights were still expanded.

The offensive raised questions from the start militarily. Kiev hoped that the Russians would pull troops out of the Donbass under the shock and move to Kursk. But the Russian high command showed iron nerves, laid only a few units and kept the focus in the east. Nevertheless, the Russians managed to limit the Ukrainian spatial profits at Kursk. Further attempts to expand the front lead to the west or east and to create smaller boilers on the border mostly failed in the beginning or came to a standstill after minimal off -road. One last advance towards the north only led to temporarily penetrating some settlements.

The front lead lost its military value. The region had no strategic importance after the hope of reaching Kursk or at least the power plant there. What remained was a global PR win, the humiliation of Putin and the idea of ​​using the area as a fist pan in negotiations. However, Kiev used his most motivated and best equipped troops, including the 82nd air land brigade, which was then missing in the east to stop the Russian advance. Even then, the offensive strategically helped Russia.

Then the Russians began to push the front lead. Kyiv slowly lost large parts of the conquered area. The Russians of the only fixed supply street approached the base of the occupied cake and brought them under the control of their drones in early March 2025. The lead gradually became a boiler. Russian drones made the supply and removal of the wounded impossible. But Sudscha initially seemed safely, protected by a ring from settlements in the north and east developed into fortresses. The Ukrainians pushed back heavy Russian attacks, but there was no collapse of the lines. In the long term, the Russians would have pushed the Ukrainians back, albeit slowly. The greatest danger threatened at the border, where an attack could have created a real boiler.

But it turned out differently. The Russians attacked in the north and used a rotation of the Ukrainian troops in the northeast. The newly introduced soldiers of the territorial defense had little combat value and had not yet set up. The Russians conquered the positions above Malaya Loknya, which was then not to be held. At the same time, they struck in the center of the Ukrainian area – through a gas pipeline they came far behind the Ukrainian lines. This operation, the largest “hussar piece” of the war, is reminiscent of a modern Trojan horse.

The pipeline, part of the former transit network to Europe, has been unused since the Ukrainian blockade in 2024. Russian engineers had apparently mapped them months before and prepared for military use, which indicates long -term planning. The preparation was masterful: the tube system was emptied, filled with breathing air and crossed by over 800 soldiers – about two battalions. They moved more than ten kilometers, cut the tube on a row of trees and penetrated outside. From there they moved north and south towards an industrial area east of Sudscha, met with little resistance and built a defense zone. This enemy enclave in the back of the Ukrainians blocked the connection paths between the city and the front. The Ukrainians also disabled destroyed bridges and river courses.

When the Ukrainians failed to clear the Russian enclaves, the fate of their northeastern positions was sealed. The defense belt dissolved, the soldiers fled, Sudscha fell. The city’s western foothills should now also be lost. Resistance nests were destroyed by Russian 3000 kg sliding bombs. Ukraine has apparently already deducted its elite units. Sudscha became a disaster: the majority of the material falls into the hands of the Russians, wounded remain, drone recordings show withdrawals of small groups on foot and under Russian fire. This is a triumph for Russia: they conquer their area, strengthen the morals of their troops through a bold maneuver and celebrate it propagandistically with videos from the tube, greetings for women and report on gray -hard pioneers.

The consequences hit Ukraine hard. The courtyard offensive is part of the defeats since Bachmut. The calls for a diplomatic solution are becoming more because the military setbacks of Kiev fuel doubts about a victory. The prospects to push the Russians back. The losses of well -trained soldiers and materials – tanks, artillery, supplies – are hard to replace, while Putin can also move his troops to other fronts after a break. With the reconquest of the Kursk area, the Russian armed forces could now increasingly aim at Saporischschja or Charkov.

The pressure can also increase in Donbass, where the Ukrainian defense is crumbling. The victory reduces the chances of an armistice. In the east, Ukraine stabilizes the situation isolated – at Pokrowsk or Toretsk – but the momentum is with Russia, and Kursk continues to accelerate it. Sudscha is remembered as a symbol of Russian boldness and as a mistake by the Ukrainian high command to withdraw the troops in good time – a disaster with far -reaching military and political consequences.