Syria: How a new war can be prevented

Last weekend, fights between the new rulers and members of the old regime broke out in Syria. Islamist militias carried out several massacres in the Alawite community. Syrian human rights organizations counted up to. The star spoke to the Middle East expert Daniel Gerlach about the situation in the crisis state.

Mr. Gerlach, Syria is an incredibly diverse country. Maybe you can help us get an overview. Who actually lives everything in Syria?
I would be happy to tell you that. But then it will be a very long interview.

Start calmly. We’ll see how far we get.
There is hardly a country in the Middle East in which so many different ethnic groups and denomination communities live as in Syria. In addition to the Sunni-Arab majority, ethnic and denominational minorities can be found. Whereby these can also be sunnites or Arabs. There are nine Christian denominations alone. There are also Drusen, Alawites, Ismailites, Shiites. Not to forget Kurds, Tscherkesse, Turkmen, Armenian and Yazidis.

The weekend massacres primarily hit the Alawites. Can you briefly explain who the Alawites are?
Alawites are often referred to in reporting as Shiite groups. That is not theologically true, but only in terms of its history. Incidentally, they are also not to be confused with the Alevis, which we mainly know from Turkey. The Alawites are a fascinating esoteric current with mystical and ancient, pre -Islamic elements that emerged from Islam. There are big dissent – also within the Alawi Community – on the question of whether the Alawites are Muslims or only shaped Islamic. Syrian law sees them as Muslims. At the same time, there are dozens of fatwas, legal reports, of extremist-Islamist scholars, the Alawites do not recognize neither as Muslims nor at all as their own religious community. Accordingly, they would be unbelievers. Religiously motivated hatred of alawites is a factor that comes into play again and again.

What role did the Alawites play in the regime?
The Assad family is alawistic. They were the first Alawites to make political power at all. The Assad regime has given many Alawites access to positions in the state apparatus, the military and the secret services. According to the calculation, the Alawites would behave particularly loyally. Because of the family and cultural relationships with the Assads, but also because of the fear and distrust of the Sunni majority. The regime fueled this fear. Although many people in the Alawite Community did not even benefit from the regime. They remained poor and were even locked up as opposition. The community was taken hostage and forced into a loyalty pact.

In the past, they have repeatedly pointed out the high blood roll that the Alawi community paid.
Most Alawite families are not wealthy. They didn’t have the chance to buy from military service, which was common practice. As an Alawit, you had a job with the state and served in the army. The rebels were well armed at the beginning of the war and added great losses to the regime’s armed forces and paramilitaries. The regime is responsible for many civilian victims in Syria. But there were also many fatalities on the side of the armed forces. In some places there are hardly young and medium -sized men in the villages on the coast, in the Alawites settlement area.

Has the Alawite community also invited to blame in this war?
There is no collective debt. Sunni and Alawite dignitaries have repeatedly pointed out in recent years that one cannot be blamed for a denomination for crimes because of its belonging. But many people in Syria see it differently. In their eyes, the Alawites were the ruling power behind the Assad regime. It can be assumed that a higher number of alawites have been involved in war crimes and torture – as a percentage of the population. Precisely because many Alawites served as officers. But therefore to make the entire community liable, I think that is immoral, dangerous and absurd.

Shortly before the massacres, you warned that the situation in Syria is tense. Was it just a matter of time before it comes to such an outbreak of violence?
Yes, that was to be feared. The regime has disappeared overnight. There are still weapons everywhere. The new government under Ahmed al-Sharaa has released a large part of the army and civil service officials, which of course met many Alawites. Many have not received a salary for months. As a result, there were protests. Gangs of the old regime used this. They provoked incidents and lured the government’s security forces in an ambush. Militias took this as an opportunity to take revenge on the Alawites as a whole. These include the government militia, but above all probably those associations that are not under their direct command.

What role did the new rulers play in Syria, the HTS militia and Ahmed al-Sharaa?
It is unclear: Didn’t the Al-Sharaa government prevent this? Or did she not take it through because at that time she did not want to risk an open conflict with rival groups of her own alliance? I suspect that the second is the case. I don’t think Al-Sharaa wanted such massacres. But the price was too high for him that it would have cost to oppose the other extremists. Especially since the militias of the new government had to complain about numerous victims. The desire for retaliation was great. Now his rivals have exposed themselves as a butcher in their own alliance. And a lesson was granted to the Alawites so that they never rise again. At least that’s how it should see it in Damascus.

At the beginning, they addressed the division of the country that the Assad regime had systematically advanced. Let us take a look into the future: Will the country get rid of the height of the old regime at some point?
Yes, that can be overcome, but only if the politically responsible people are serious. When we look at the long history of Syria, there have always been moments when the population has held together.

How can this be overcome?
First, the international community must keep up the pressure and have an eye on the protection and participation of the population groups. If necessary, the West must also be willing to show military strength when militias go to the population. Second, a professional, reliable army and police forces that are rooted locally and to which people trust is needed. Third: You have to deal with language. If one speaks of the jihad against the “remains of the old regime”, this can be understood as a free letter to the mass murder of alawites. And fourth: it needs a judiciary that is pursuing criminals, but is not a winning judiciary. For this, trustworthy, social personalities from all communities are essential. You now have to take over the mediation.

Some people may think of the latest reports: again and again the Middle East. There will never be peace in this region. Is that correct?
Interestingly, I am currently writing a book on this topic. If you look at the whole story of the Middle East, the phases in which there have been no devastating wars are longer than in Europe. But in particular in recent decades, we see the overlay of geopolitical conflicts and ethnic-confessional contrasts. This is a very toxic mix. But there are countries that have managed to overcome this. I am very often in Iraq. Ten years ago I was skeptical whether security ever stopped there. A reasonably normal coexistence between Sunnis and Shiites seemed to me far away. Today this topic has clearly taken a back seat for the young generation. I also see this option in Syria. Even if the events of the past few days have not exactly led to strengthening trust.