Drones on Moscow: Why an attack would strengthen Putin

In the past few days, the possibility of a Ukrainian drone attack on the parade to commemorate the victory in World War II in Moscow has been discussed. How realistic would such an attack?

Basically, Kiev has an armada of long-distance roar, including types such as the UJ-22 airborne and modified self-made drones that can reach ranges of up to 1000 kilometers. Supported by Western technology, Ukraine has significantly increased its production capacities for drones, which makes an attack on the Kremlin technically possible. The route of the parade is known, as is the appointment. This would make the event an easy goal.

An attack would hit the prestige and ego of the Kreml ruler and impressively show the world to what sensitive kiev is capable of. Such actions build on former Ukrainian drone attacks, for example on Belgorod or Rostow am Don, which demonstrated Kiev’s ability to use far -reaching warfare. The sensation would be significantly greater than in the regular attacks on ammunition warehouse or oil refineries, the PR effect of which has largely exhausted itself. Ukraine keeps working on such missions, but so far they had hardly any noticeable effects on the course of the soil war, for example in the competitive Donetsk region or in Ukrainian fights in the Russian Oblast Kursk.

However, such an operation in the middle of Moscow is extremely difficult. The attack would not be unexpected. The Russians are aware of the targets and time windows, and they will protect the parade and the Kremlin even more than they do anyway. Moscow is surrounded by advanced air defense systems such as S-400 and Pantsir-S1, which have recently been reinforced, for example on May 5, 2025. Any destination in the big city of Moscow is a completely different challenge than successfully achieving the narrow, central space of the parade. In mass attacks, Kiev used around 200 long -distance roar on January 15, 2025, which, however, flew different destinations in Russia, often started from areas such as Sumy or the Ukrainian -controlled region of Kursk, about 450 to 600 kilometers from Moscow. This number could probably be increased and all drones are concentrated on one goal.

In order to disturb the celebration, the drones would not even have to achieve their goal in large numbers. An air alarm would be triggered when a drone swarm approaches, and the event would probably be canceled.

The question of whether Kiev can disturb the prestigious event can therefore be answered with “yes”. However, the next question is which military options Putin would have. A similar celebration takes place in Kyiv almost at the same time. It is also vulnerable, although Russia’s possibilities are significantly larger than the Kievs. Putin is not alone on slow drones to attack Kyiv. This is also only about 150 kilometers from Russian -controlled area, such as the Tschernihiw or Belarus region.

The Kremlin could attack the Ukrainian capital with much faster and more effective weapons. In his arsenal there are “kinschal” hyper-sound missiles launched from the air, ballistic rockets of the “Iskander” type and possibly the new “Oreschnik” rocket, which has so far only been used once. These weapons are much more valuable, and Usually Russia does not use them in mass attacks. However, Putin could fall back on his reserves for a retaliation.

In the past, for example during the intensive attacks on Kiev 2022, the Ukrainian air defense was only able to intercept ballistic rockets in exceptional cases. In view of the currently weakened air defense, exhausted by ongoing Russian attacks, individual missiles could be shot down, but Russia’s rockets would hit their goals in the mass. In addition to the fast blow through valuable rockets, Kyiv could then be attacked by drones. These would have a longer flight time, but could be started from a significantly lower distance, for example from Russian bases in Belarus. The result: While Ukraine can primarily achieve a symbolic success with its drones, the Kremlin could cause massive destruction in Kiev and at the celebration there.

Putin has the better cards purely militarily, and politically it looks similar. The victory parade on May 9th is the most important holiday in Russia and is of great symbolic importance among the population, reinforced by Putin’s rhetoric, which links the Second World War to the current conflict. The participation of international guests, for example from the Brics countries, underlines their global relevance. An attack on the ceremony would trigger a wave of patriotic outrage – especially if spectators or even veterans of the Great Patriotic War were harmed. Russian propaganda would use such incidents to emphasize civilian victims and further mobilize the population.

Putin would then have a “carte blanche” in her hand in terms of domestic policy. How he uses it is difficult to predict. Among other things, he could officially explain the war. At the front, where there has been war for over three years, this would not change. Such an attack certainly does not mean that Putin would use nuclear weapons. But in the Russian population, approval for a nuclear “solution” of the conflict would grow. In terms of domestic policy, the state of war would open up far -reaching possibilities to the Kremlin, including mobilization. However, this would hardly be necessary because the army already flows up enough volunteers. An attack on the parade would further increase its number.

The foreign policy damage for Kyiv would be even greater. If there is a drone attack on the Moscow victory parade and a Russian counter -strike, Kiev would have the sole responsibility for the escalation. The US and China’s reactions are particularly important internationally. For the Trump government, which urges the conflict quickly, an attack would be a clear signal that Selenskyj wants to continue the war. The relationships between Washington and Kiev should continue to cool down, possibly accompanied by reduced military support or sanctions.

Beijings’ reaction could be even more problematic. If XI Jinping is forced to look for protection in a bunker, China would have to react. Neither the government nor the Chinese population would accept such an affront. Peking is already the most important ally, especially economically, while it avoids direct arms export. This could change abruptly. China is unsurpassed in armaments production. The fights on the front line are dominated by small drones, and China’s production capacities are almost unlimited. If Beijing begins to supply Russia with drones or other weapons, this could significantly change the dynamics on the front.